

**BARIŞ VAKFI**  
**WAQFA AŞİTİYÊ/ PEACE FOUNDATION**

**THE PEACE PROCESS FROM DOLMABAHÇE TO PRESENT-DAY:**  
**UNDERSTANDING FAILURE AND FINDING NEW PATHS**

Cuma ÇİÇEK & Vahap COŞKUN

April 1, 2016, ANKARA

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Understanding Failure and Finding New Paths**

Politics Report – 1  
April 2016, İstanbul

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We wanted to share the first study of the Peace Foundation with you.

The Peace Foundation was formed after the 7 years experience of “Turkey Peace Assembly”

We aim to institutionalize, bring continuity, enrich and exceed the work of the Peace Assembly. We will do so with the solidarity, contribution and mutual effort with our dear friends that believe in peace.

This report is an outcome of such endeavour.

A year ago Turkey Peace Assembly published a report called “*Towards Resolution: An Evolution of Prospects, Opportunities and Issues*” written by four precious academics and a journalist. The report encompassed the period up to Seven June elections.

For the aftermath, “The Peace Process from Dolmabahçe to Present-Day: Understanding Failure and Finding New Paths” can be seen as the continuity of the prior report. As it can be understood from the name these two reports that encompass qualitatively two different periods, express the necessity and durability of peace studies. The existential reason for Peace Foundation is in every circumstance, for every conflict contributes to the resolution through civil politics, dialogue and negotiation.

In an era where even the word ‘peace’ is difficult to articulate, the insistence and the effort gain more significance. As structured in the report Turkey is going through a challenging process. This is a process that can be overcome mutually, not through imprudently taking sides. We can build peace which is distant today only if we pursue truth and goodness.

The report tells us this. It gives advice on the formation of a political will for peace. It reveals that resolution comes through the language of peace. We want to remind that as other examples of resolution demonstrates, the courage to embrace with criticism and self-criticism makes the tackling of the current crisis helps to stop or reduce conflict, polarization, tension and death.

The work tried to contribute to this aspect. For this precious work we gratitude once again Cuma ÇİÇEK one of the founders of our foundation and Lecturer at Mardin Artuklu University and Vahap COŞKUN Lecturer at Dicle University. In a short time, they have done a good job.

Your contributions and suggestions will enrich our work.

Peace Foundation Chairman  
Ayşe Soysal

## Introduction

*“Those thousands, millions of people who are pouring into these arenas are burning with the passion of Newroz. They cry for peace and amity, and they are demanding a solution. Today we are awakening to a new Turkey and a new Middle East.*

*The youth who have welcomed my call, the eminent women who heeded my call, friends who have accepted my discourse and all people who can hear my voice:*

*Today a new era is beginning. The period of armed struggle is ending, and the door is opening to democratic politics. We are beginning a process focused on political, social and economic aspects; an understanding based on democratic rights, freedoms, and equality is growing.”*

The words above are from Öcalan’s Newroz call in 2013.

Öcalan made this call at the aftermath of a 30-year conflict period that resulted in immense destruction on humanitarian, social, economic and spatial grounds with the knowledge and confirmation of the state, in a symbolic place like Diyarbakır, on a symbolic day and in front of almost a million people. When remembering this historic call, we have to admit that as the media, civil society organizations, academia, political institutions and society we have failed to evaluate a big opportunity.

Not much only a year ago we were talking about the withdrawal of PKK’s armed branch off borders, disarmament unitarily in Turkey and the resolution of the Kurdish issue in peaceful and democratic means. The peace process that started with the 2013 Newroz Statement aimed re-shaping Turkey’s relation with Kurds beyond its borders to the regional scale. However, today we are face to face with clashes expanding to cities, furthermore a new cross-border wave of conflict in terms of PYD/YPG.

This report embraces the Peace Process that has created great hope in the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue through the disarmament of PKK in Turkey and the delivery of a comprehensive democratization process. By this means it aims to restart the process that was halted, bring back the command of words, dialogue, politics and contribute to the quest of resolving the Kurdish issue that is shifting to an incompatible line.

The report focuses on the process that was set off with the press statement that was led by HDP representatives and the state. By scrutinizing failure in order to form a new path, it presents policy recommendations to primary politicians and all related actors.

By this means firstly it takes into consideration –with its symbolic significance- the Newroz call of 2013. The second part discusses the Dolmabahçe Statement as a verge that could not be overcome. In the third section the socio-political effects of the conflict between July 2015- March 2016 is examined. The fourth section argues why did the 2013-2015 Peace Process ended with failure. The fifth section scrutinizes how the final clashes are on a path with no winners. The last section in the light of prior experiences gathers some policy recommendations to find a new path. Additionally, the chronology added to the report evokes the major cases from Dolmabahçe to present day.

## Remembering the 2013 Newroz Declaration

The peace process started on March 21, 2013, in a historical day of Newroz. Öcalan’s call<sup>1</sup> was announced in the presence of hundreds of thousands of live broadcasting in mainstream television channels from Diyarbakır’s Newroz square. Taking into consideration the societal psychology of Turkey after the humanitarian, socio-economic and spatial destruction of the conflict proceeding since 1984 the call of PKK leader in such a symbolic space and time announced live for millions marked a historical day for Turkish society. Hope was designated for the Kurdish issue to be resolved with diplomacy after a long period of weapons and violence.

The context of the call was striking as the form. Öcalan declared that “a door has opened from armed struggle to the democratic politics”. For this, “the grounding verdict of our new struggle is ideology and democratic politics, setting off a large democratic move.” Öcalan, emphasizing the demand for peace, fraternity and resolution was

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<sup>1</sup> The whole script of the declaration is available in the media. See. Bianet, “Öcalan’ın Açıklaması: ‘Silahlı Güçler Sınırdışı, Artık Siyaset Dönemi’,” *Bianet*, 21 Mart 2013, <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/145269-silahl-gucler-sinirdisina-artik-siyaset-donemi>, Accessed in: 19 Şubat 2016.

signalling that we are waking up “to a new Turkey, new Middle East, new future.” Undoubtedly the critical respondent to the text was armed forces of PKK: “Now it is time to withdraw our armed components off borders.”

Öcalan was reformulating political objectives as well as the new method of contention that they were going to ground in the new era. More precisely the discourse that was grounded in the 1990s and became official when he was captured in 1999 was folding to a more striking content: For Öcalan, “forming ethnic and single nationed geographies is an objective of modernity, an inhumane invention that denies our origins”. Because of this, “Everyone bears huge responsibility for the formation of a democratic country in which all peoples and cultures are equal, free and that is worthy of the history of Kurdistan and Anatolia”.

Öcalan, in his Newroz Declaration, apart from Kurds was calling for other ethnic/national groups to join the construction of new Turkey: “In respect to Newroz I call for Armenians, Turkmens, Assyrians, Arabs and other peoples in communities to see the light of freedom and equality arising from the fire that is lit and call on them to see and live it as their own light for equality and freedom.”

One of the crucial points of the declaration was Öcalan’s call for the Turkish people. Öcalan, was giving reference to the fact that Turks and Kurds were living under the “Flag of Islam” close to 1000 years. Under the brotherhood and solidarity based on law was calling two strategic forces in the Middle East to form an alliance, to embrace each other and ‘write off each other’s debts.’

When examined as a whole it is possible to gather the Newroz Declaration under several titles:

- The Peace Process was taken into consideration as a re-organization across the Middle East, going beyond Turkey.
- There was a reference to the negative role of interventions, repressive regimes, role of elites in the emergence of the Kurdish issue.
- The past struggle was embraced, the gains were emphasized. It was indicated that new conditions require a different mode of struggle.
- Turkey was opening a new page and solidly this meant farewell to arms and the cross-border withdrawal of armed PKK components.
- The proceeding of the new era was adopting democratic politics.
- Calling for the formation of a new ‘smaller nation states’ in ethnic/national majoritarian lines was rejected
- The historical relations between Kurds and Turks were emphasized with the reference to ‘Islamic unity.’
- As two strategic forces in the Middle East, Kurds and Turks should ‘write off each other’s debts’ and form an alliance.

### **Dolmabahçe: The Failure to Overcome the Critical Verge or the End of the Exploration Stage**

The 2013 Newroz Declaration after a two-year dialogue process came to a critical verge with the Dolmabahçe Declaration. At February 28, 2015 at the Prime Minister’s Office at Dolmabahçe, the parties to the Peace Process made a mutual statement in front of the cameras for the first time. The Government was represented by Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan, Interior Minister Efkan Ala, Group Deputy Chairman of AKP Mahir Ünal and Under Secretariat of Public Order and Security Muhammed Dervişoğlu. On the other side of the table there were members of the HDP İmralı Committee Sırrı Süreyya Önder, İdris Baluken and Pervin Buldan.<sup>2</sup>

Sırrı Süreyya Önder reading the text of the İmralı Committee emphasized that the: “resolution of the Kurdish issue or it’s deadlock is not solely on our peoples as it has regional and global content” and underlined that the process has come to an “official, serious and accountable” stage. Önder, indicating that “we are in a historical decision-making verge on the Peace Process”, spelled out “Öcalan’s fundamental detection on the reached stage” with these words:

*“While carrying out 30 years of conflict to peace our first goal is to reach a democratic resolution. I call for PKK in the months of spring to gather an extraordinary congress to give the strategic and historical decision to lay down arms in the basis that minimum common principles are ensured.”*

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<sup>2</sup> The whole text of the declaration is available online. See. AljazeeraTurk, “Ortak açıklamanın tam metni,” *AljazeeraTurk*, 28 Şubat 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/ortak-aciklamanin-tam-metni>, Erişim tarihi: 21 Şubat 2016.

*This invitation is a historical statement of intent for armed struggle to be replaced with democratic politics. Our factual titles for establishing a genuine democracy and forming the backbone of our massive peace are mainly:*

1. *The definition of democratic politics and its content*
2. *The identification of national and local dimensions for democratic resolution*
3. *The legal and democratic guarantees for free citizenship*
4. *The headings on the relationship of democratic politics with the state, society and its institutionalization*
5. *The socio-economic dimensions of the peace process*
6. *The peace process to be tackled in a way that will protect the relationship between democracy and security, protect public order and freedoms*
7. *The legal resolution and guarantees for woman, culture and ecologic problems*
8. *The enhancement of pluralistic democratic development oriented with the concept of identity and its recognition*
9. *Defining the democratic republic, common homeland, nation with democratic measures and in a pluralistic system giving them legal and constitutional guarantees*
10. *A new constitution that aims to internalize all democratic moves and transformation*
11. *There is no doubt that in order for these expected historical developments to take place a solidified non-conflict is a requisite*

Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan, making a statement based on a written text confirmed that *“a crucial point was reached in the Peace Process.”* Akdoğan stated that in the board of the Peace Process, with the presidency of the prime minister they have reached the current stage in a comprehensive manner with its all aspects and pointed out that *“they found the statement on the acceleration of laying down arms, adopting full in-action and putting forward democratic politics as a method, significant development.”*

By pointing out that in its 12 years of power the AKP had led reforms exemplary of a “quite revolution,” Akdoğan pointed politics as the means for resolution. According to Deputy Prime Minister,

*“Our democracy has reached the capability and feasibility to talk, discuss and resolve our problems. It is clear that for our democracy to enhance all fractions of society, NGOs need to give their all. The deactivation of weapons will accelerate the democratization process. Some titles are talked and discussed for many years. From now on we should not stay away from talks and discussions with self-confidence. In democracies the viewpoints, opinions and policies that gain people support wins. We, with the blessings of our people are determined to lead the process to the final outcome.”*

By evaluating the problem in the frame of democratization and laying down arms Akdoğan stated that the government saw the new constitution as *“a crucial opportunity for the resolution of rooted and chronic problems”* According to Akdoğan *“basic expansion of basic rights and freedoms contribute to unity by providing equitable and fraternal environment. It will further enhance the sense of belonging of our citizens. Turkey by leaving behind its fundamental problems will emerge as a global and regional power.”*

By addressing to the President, Deputy Prime Minister Akdoğan emphasized that what remained crucial was the implementation and for the process to take shape in flesh and bones solid development needed to come through.

The statements at Dolmabahçe showed there was an agreement for *“PKK to go to Congress to replace armed struggle with democratic politics”* in exchange for the negotiations to be led around a new constitution based on a pluralistic democratic system.

### **The Returning Conflict and its Escalation: Urban Conflicts and its Socio-political Effects**

Nevertheless, the period didn't proceed as it was foreseen in the Dolmabahçe meeting. At the very time as it was convicted that *“the critical threshold on the Kurdish issue has been exceeded and it was leaving the path of weapons, violence and turning political path instead.”* However, what happened after the meeting at Dolmabahçe ended the two-year dialogue process. *(we gave chronology of developments in the Appendix 01)* As a result of recent developments in a year, the two-year non-conflict ended with overflowed conflict from rural to urban areas, intensified to levels that were not experienced in 30 years and brought great destruction.

### **Loss of Life and Social Destruction**



According to the records of *Presidential Chief of Staff* by the date of March 10, 2016, only in Sur-Diyarbakir 216, in Cizre-Şırnak 665, in İdil 125 and in total 1076 member of the organization has lost their life<sup>3</sup>. According to the PKK/KCK endorsement in the year of 2015, a total of 1818 people were killed including 261 armed militants, 1250 soldiers, 132 police officers, 162 Special Operations Police and 13 high-ranking military officers (the loss of life increasing every day<sup>4</sup>).

According to the report prepared by the Security General Directorate in December 2015 and submitted to the Ministry of Interior, the total of the population affected by the curfew was determined as 1 million 300 hundred thousand. According to the report 100 thousand people had to leave their houses because of the conflicts<sup>5</sup>. The sources close to the government point out that as a result of the curfew, the conflicts at the city and operations the number of people who had to leave their houses had reached to 200 hundred thousand by the end of January, 2016.<sup>6</sup> According to Minister of Health Müezzinoğlu, 355 thousand people was forced to migrate due to the terrorist events.<sup>7</sup>

Citizens that constitute the majority of the displaced are the victims of forced displacement in 1990's. After a devastating social trauma and great difficulties, the victims had moved from outskirts to the cities and established a new life. However, for the second time after 20 years they have been displaced again.

According to the data of Human Rights Foundation of Turkey from August, 16, 2015 to March, 18, 2016, there has been curfew in Diyarbakır (34 times), in Şırnak (9 times), in Mardin (11 times), in Hakkâri (5 times), in Batman (2 times), in Muş (1 time) and in Elazığ. (1 time) In line with the official reports there were at least 63 times indefinite and day long curfew in total 22 districts. Also during the official curfew time period -between the dates mentioned- at the related districts, at least 310 civilians died including 72 children, 62 women, 29 of them being older than 60<sup>8</sup>.

Besides the loss of life and forced migration, the conflicts resulted in great urban destruction. Cities such as Cizre, Silopi, Sur and Nusaybin were damaged so extensively that they will require rebuilding. As a matter of fact the size of the urban destruction was reflected to the report that was prepared by the government's **"Counterterrorism and Rehabilitation Action Plan"**<sup>9</sup>. The sixth title of the "Master Plan" –that included 10 titles- spared a part for "revitalization of cities" and a special highlight was given to the Sur district of Diyarbakır that suffered a big blow to its historical texture<sup>10</sup>.

The Conflict paralyzed the socio-economic life. For example, the economic life in Sur-Diyarbakır which has thousands of workplaces and more than 50 thousand of workers stopped entirely. As the economic activity in Sur spreads in a regional network beyond Diyarbakır, the loss expands beyond it. The size of the damage can be understandable from M.Gürçan's study on the detailed chart of economic loss during the curfew times between the dates 4 to 12 September 2015<sup>11</sup>. According to Gürçan, the urban conflicts for just a couple of days in the period of curfew cost Turkey 100 million Turkish Lira. Similarly, in Silopi where intensive conflicts happened, the cost of urban destruction was determined as 82 million TL<sup>12</sup>.

### ***Socio-political Consequences of Urban Conflicts***

The end of the Resolution Process, especially the curfew setting off from the date August 16, 2015, and

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<sup>3</sup>"Önemli Yurtiçi Olaylar", *Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı*, 10.03.2016, [http://www.tsk.tr/4\\_olaylar/4\\_2\\_important\\_yurtici\\_olaylar/important\\_yurticiolaylar.html](http://www.tsk.tr/4_olaylar/4_2_important_yurtici_olaylar/important_yurticiolaylar.html), Erişim tarihi: 12.03.2016.

<sup>4</sup> "2015'in savaş bilançosu", *Özgür Gündem*, 04.01.2016.

<sup>5</sup> "5 İlçe kritik", *Hürriyet*, 23.12.2015.

<sup>6</sup> Selvi, Abdulkadir, "Başbakan'ın bölge programı", *Yeni Şafak*, 28.01.2016.

<sup>7</sup> "355 bin kişi terörden göç etti", *Hürriyet*, 27.02.2016.

<sup>8</sup>For the report see.: Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı (2016), "TİHV Dokümantasyon Merkezi Verilerine Göre 16 Ağustos 2015 – 18 Mart 2016 Tarihleri Arasında Sokağa Çıkma Yasakları ve Yaşamlarını Yitiren Siviller", TİHV, 22.03.2016, <http://tihv.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/TİHV-Sokağa-Çıkma-Yasakları-Bilgi-Notu-18-Mart-2016.pdf>, Accessed At: 22.03.2016.

<sup>9</sup> "Başbakan 'master planı' açıkladı", *Yeni Şafak*, 05.02.2016.

<sup>10</sup> Başbakan Davutoğlu Mardin'de eylem planını açıkladı", *Milliyet*, 05.02.2016.

<sup>11</sup> Gürçan, Metin, "Kent çatışmalarının ekonomik ve sosyal bilançosu: Cizre örneği", *T24*, 29.12.2015.

<sup>12</sup> "Terörün Silopi'ye faturası ağır", *Yeni Şafak*, 07.03.2016.

increasing urban conflicts as summarized above created socio-economic destruction, as well as humanitarian, social, urban ones. If we list these destructions:

1. Current policies of violence independently from the intentions of AKP Government and PKK/KCK has disrupted/disrupting severely and quickly “the internal resolution politics” based on solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey's borders since 1990's.
2. The HDP project that was offering Turkey an opportunity to overcome social divisions caused by 30 years of conflict and enhancing social integration had a major blow.
3. After the long process -more than two years- of dialogue, the increase of violence that included the urban areas, undermined the faith in the solution of the Kurdish issue through peaceful democratic means. The construction of social peace and the resolution of the Kurdish issue has become much more difficult today than the past.
4. As in the context of Turkey, remarkable decomposition also occurred in the Kurdish community. As the majority of the urban conflicts occurred in the districts of the victims of forced displacement in the 1990s; class segregation in the Kurdish community deepened. In this period the displaced population was deprived of the most basic humanitarian conditions and solidarity endeavors were insufficient to work for them. This contributed to the deepening of class divisions and dissolution of social solidarity networks.
5. Apart from the differentiation of social class, political disintegration deepened. When remembering the bloody conflicts of the 1990s, for the resolution of the Kurdish issue through political and democratic means the consensus among different political groups at the regional scale had a great importance to sustain compromise. Conflict in the cities was a major blow to the possibility of political compromise as it raised political conflicts and divisions.
6. The political arena experienced a tremendous strike. As the resolution of the Kurdish issue –in the popular phrase- is connected to “closing the path to mountains, expanding political opportunities” the expansion of the political arena is vital. Unfortunately, because of intensive conflicts the area for politics and words became considerably narrow. The experience of HDP is very a striking example. Before the June 7, 2015, elections HDP, an actor which was getting stronger on a daily basis as the third largest party in parliament today lost its effect on a large scale and has embarked from being a decisive factor in the field.
7. The civilian arena was affected as much as the political one. In recent years, numerous people from different political opinions had set up NGOs working in different areas. These NGO's played a very important role in the normalization of social relationships. Nevertheless, with the increasing conflicts in the area NGO's were tightened and subsided into silence. When it is thought that the Kurdish issue can be solved with the expansion of civilian area, this situation should be approached very carefully from all sides.
8. The expansion of the grey areas in the construction of consensus and strengthening of the capacity of the actors who speak with different sides holds an important place for conflict resolution. Urban conflict has narrowed considerably and reduced the possibilities of criticism and forced (still forcing) sides (outside from conflicts) to be silent.
9. As a result of the contraction of grey areas, the public spheres' in other words the sound of the street, is being narrowed more and more every day.
10. Socio-political devastations hampered the productive functions of political solutions and reduced confidence and hope in politicians and political institutions as a whole.

11. Each day was marked with increased social militarization. It should be noted that, this situation will create serious medium and long-term social problems. Militarism is going to produce great social risks for the children and young people confronted in conflict and curfew zones. Serious number of children were exposed to violence or weapons and/or have used violence and weapons. Even if there is a political solution in the near future for the Kurdish issue, children and young people who already have established this kind of relation with weapons, stand out as a major threat because they might go to the social groups that adopt violence as the main method to stand out.

12. Facing the past, ensuring social justice, 'writing off each other's debts' and building peace based on equality was already standing in front of the actors as a difficult task and responsibility. Solving the Kurdish issue was an important beginning for building peace. The construction of peace was already a very difficult issue however after current urban conflicts it fell into pieces. Political solution of the Kurdish issue became harder.

13. In conclusion, the process is much more behind than the one started at Newroz, 2013.

### **Why did the 2013-2015 Peace Process Fail?**

The question "why did the 2013-2015 Peace Process fail" has to be answered in order to again put the negotiation and dialogue process on the table instead of weapons and violence, resolve current conflicts that caused so much destruction and death. Giving factual and sufficient explanations can contribute to a new dialogue and negotiation period.

Although there are many dynamics that has caused the Peace Process to fail, main structural faults should be underlined: (1) The usage of time, (2) extreme uncertainty and (3) failure to comply to commitments. The Process inherently contained many challenges but when structural defects were added the process broke down.

#### ***The Usage of Time***

In the Middle East the usage of time has a critical importance as the time flows faster, conditions and the balance of power constantly change and the actors can change their positions and their alliances at any moment. As a result of the changes in both regional and nationwide scale between the years 2013-2015, there has been a change on the power, capacity, alliances and consequently demands of the parties involved in the process.

In these two and half years' crucial endeavour has been led in Turkey. The process got socialized, the perception of peace became the dominant idea and even though it was not enough legal infrastructure was prepared. Remembering these gains is the requirement of fairness: all this time was not wasted, some points were exceeded.

With this, two important mistakes that occurred were relevant with the usage of time. Firstly, the process extended to an open-ended schedule. This attitude can be understandable at the outset. However, after reaching some point a "time schedule" should have been made on what steps will be taken in how much time it will be determined. The public should have been informed so that a democratic pressure could have been made to parties in order to complete the works as planned. These were not done. From time to time some dates were mentioned but they stayed as rumours and were just arbitrary. There wasn't any supervising done.

During all this time crucial important events occurred. New problem areas aroused and new unknown groups were born. Rojava has become an issue relating to the process. PYD, ISIS and their connections started to become directly involved with the process. This led to the changes in the balances in the environment. As the process wasn't recorded and accordingly it became vulnerable as a result of this new dynamic. The intricate relationships, the change of demands and the acquisition of a new position caused the process to loose it's resistance and finally received a deep wound.

The Second mistake regarding the usage of time was that the process had become extremely sensitive to political calendar. Parties put short-term policy objectives above the process. In this manner their attitudes before June, 7 is very instructive. During the election process both sides put each other on target board. They campaigned against each other; AKP played on nationalism, and HDP played on popular opposition against Erdoğan. They avoided a stronger ownership of the process, they knocked each other and also eroded the common ground they have created. For four months not a single political move was made after the joint press conference held in the Dolmabahçe Palace on February, 28 that could feed the process. When politics withdrew the thing that occurs anywhere around the globe happened; weapons filled the gap of politics and the process entered a downturn.

### ***Extreme Uncertainty***

A resolution process usually consists of four stages: Interaction, dialogue, negotiation and solution. Each stage needs a certain time to be completed. Inherently, the context of the objects cannot be determined right at the first time. Each point cannot be determined absolutely. Parties that build interaction after dialogue need to know each other. It is necessary that parties should recognize each other's borders, find out their "approval" or "not approval" lines and understand each other mutually.

When well organized such ambiguity can serve as a "constructive" function. It prevents the parties from the trouble of beginning the process, some congestion can lead and allow the process to be accepted by public. It can help in short-term however does not work in the long run. A long extension of ambiguity destroys the process. Therefore, after providing ground for the process, parties should resolve the ambiguity and need to provide certainty and predictability.

The process in Turkey too started with a general discourse that everyone could accept ("Mothers Not to Cry", "No More Blood" and "Violence Does Not Solve Problems") and came to a certain extent. At February, 28 a crucial step was taken in the process. The two sides announced the path the process will follow and were photographed together. Two texts were announced in the meeting: Yalçın Akdoğan on behalf of AKP, described the general democratization perspective. Sırrı Süreyya Önder declared Öcalan's 10 subject on behalf of HDP.

In this period of the process a roadmap had to be formed and the ambiguity had to be reduced to the minimum. However, the two texts lacked the content. The discourse of the government was too general. Substantially, it was saying "we are in a democratization path, as long as we continue in this path all problems will find a solution." It was not a special arrangement or text that has been worked on. Akdoğan could have done the same speech for another societal problem and probably no one would have found it odd.

Likewise, Öcalan's 10 articles did not address urgent needs. Öcalan's range was very wide. Equipping a negotiation with such heavy matters was compelling for both sides: First, attributing the process into these articles meant making the future of the process uncertain and delaying the agreement to a date that was never coming. In fact, there was a process that should be concluded as soon as possible. Linking a process like this to articles that require permanent effort with no time reference was a mistake.

Secondly, because every problem had a different respondent the negotiation could not have been led with a group that did not represent the society as a whole. For conflicts to cease, placing all societal problems as a provision was problematic. For as much as, a crucial part of these problems had characteristics that could be solved after laying down arms and democratic politics.

Actually at the aftermath of February, 28 what had to be done was clearing off ambiguity and clarifying the process. They had to put what they wanted from each other directly to the table. When and how the arms will be laid? What will be the legal situation of PKK members? How will the transition to civilian life be organized? Which laws will be changed? In which areas new laws will be formed? How much time will be spent to realize these advancements? These and questions alike were solid questions that everybody was curious about. Correspondingly, realistic and solid solutions had to be produced for them. As these were missing the process was a failure and entered a deadlock.

### ***Failure to comply to commitments***

Apart from the usage of time and extreme uncertainty, failure to comply to commitments was a crucial mistake that led to the deadlock as the sides didn't comply and/or were unwilling to comply with their promises.

After conflict, in negotiation processes parties do not easily give promises to each other. As they do not trust the other side they don't want to commit and/or they want to lead it in a minimum level. However, at a point for the process to continue mutual promises have to be made and the parties have to comply their liabilities. Consorting to liabilities before anything else forms the bridge of trust amongst the parties. The party seeing that the other is doing its share and behaving rightly will be more brave to lead big and critical steps. Each acquisition debilitates the objectors that exists in both sides. It weakens the ones favouring rigidity in the state or in the armed group. It reinforces the belief that the process is moving on and will end up with an outcome. Promises that are held increases popular support but also enables the parties to reach an agreement and makes the reached agreement lasting.

The negotiations gain value if they produce practical outcomes. If there are no practical outcomes in the course of negotiations the light at the end of the tunnel becomes invisible. The process becomes tired. The expectancy falls,

the circumstances break down. The masses that have rucked faith become sick of the process. The process is seen not as a road to peace but a path that is delaying the conflicts. The parties always find a justification for their behaviour that halts the process.

The reason for the binding of the process is the failure to comply to commitments. There are three promises that are urged upon and disrupted: The finalization of cross-border scolding, the termination of acts that harm public security and complying to the Dolmabahçe Statement.

The actors tell different stories about these three subjects. Each party says that they have been responsible but the other party has failed to fulfil its commitments and risked the process. As each party scapegoats the other and glorifies themselves they write the plusses to their section while appropriating the minus to the other.

For example, it is seen that the armed PKK forces promised to leave but after some developments went back on it. PKK said that in order for withdrawal the government promised legislation but did not fulfil it. Again for the Dolmabahçe statement PKK said that the government by putting elections forward forgot the declaration.

The government on the other hand said that in Dolmabahçe they have agreed upon a date for withdrawal but PKK failed to comply to it. As it can be seen as there is no correct and forceful insurance of information, no observatory or council to monitor the warranties of the parties and societal supervision and pressure has been weak.

### ***The Architecture of the Peace Process***

At this point it should be noted that the fundamental problem lays in the architecture of the peace process. In the dialogue and negotiation process, the failure to establish strict identification of the outreach of the process, the inability to form mechanism that will monitor the obligation of the parties has resulted in the termination of process that has created immense expectations in the public.

In this period, the changing equations on a regional scale had an adverse impact on the settlement process. The civil war in Syria grew steadily. Isis was on the rise. The Kurds at their region formed de-facto autonomous regions/cantons and established new relations with the US and Russia. All these developments have changed their position -with the errors led above- has damaged the relationship already been on thin ice and resulted in the emergence of a new wave of urban violence that we have witnessed for the past eight months.

Finally, while the parties continued dialogue on one hand, they were in preparation of a plan B against the possibility of the collapse process. Despite the two-year dialogue process, the intensification of the conflict in urban areas, still indicate that resolution has not become the solo solution for the parties, and they are preparing themselves for a plan B, that contains conflict.

### **Path with no winners**

The 2013-2015 Resolution Process ended in failure. Unfortunately, again and again we are passing through a spiral of violence. While pronouncing Cizre, Sur, Ankara, the developments suggest that on the Kurdish Issue we will go to a worse spot every day. Thresholds exceeded every day and maybe, we did not even reach the point of no return. However, the government appeal to PYD / YPG at Ankara attacks address on February 17, 2016, the images of Cizre on what is left behind after conflicts, the alliance that PKK / KCK formed under the name "United Revolutionary Movement of the People" with other different organizations and finally Ankara Güven Park massacre shows that step by step we are reaching that point.

The phrases on peace and political solution can not be heard and has become worthless. However, we do not have a choice except to remember and remind that this way. Because on the other there are no winners and there are too many losers. We want to discuss some arguments pointing out that this roadmap is a path with no winners before our advice to both sides of this road.

### ***Stalemate of PKK***

The experience of Iraq and Syria are very educative for Kurds. There is a question that must be emphasized on: in these two countries under what circumstances can Kurds by force/power construct a territorial supremacy at their region? The Iraq and Syria experience shows that these three dynamic are determining:

The central government in Baghdad and Damascus - faced an existential crisis. Apart from Kurds the country was faced with further political instability and riots where international forces are directly involved. It has to be explained that the dynamics in Turkey are different due to 3 reasons. Turkey is a NATO country, possesses the

World's 27th biggest economy, its %55-60 of foreign trade is Western countries. So what is valid for Iraq in Syria, is not valid for Turkey.

However as in Iraq since 1991 they possess' de facto territorial sovereignty after 13 years of American Intervention, US support they have not reached the point they wanted in independence. There is a few year-old war in Syria but no resolution. The country is in ruins, millions of people have to leave their homes, more than hundred thousand people lost their lives. Today all reasonable approaches show that there is no military solution on Syria. In every military mobilization apart from Russia's and US's obvious military support it is still ambiguous whether they will protect the Kurdish cantons or not.

Lastly, the experience of city clashes can be seen as an example. The majority of the people didn't support city clashes; PKK didn't find the answer it was looking for. The people didn't stand behind the trenches and barricades and didn't favour the armed autonomy complaisance. There are both economic (The middle class preventing radicalization) and legal ("the regime of punishment" after the internal security packages that made the street inactive) reasons for it. But what is determining is politics. The people do not think that another way is possible. This choice that puts daily life on hold is not embraced by the people that is chose apart from the institutional tools like Parliament, municipalities, media and NGO networks.

Also, the people are aware that the strategy and cost is incompatible. The average mindset in the street knows that the path of the process will return to the table and, therefore, asks a very legitimate question "If we are going to go back to the table why this much destruction?"

### ***Stalemate of State***

PKK cannot win this war through violence. Likewise, the state cannot win this way too. By excluding negotiations, the state cannot deal or resolve the Kurdish issue. Because:

1. The state normatively cannot win. There is a strong belief among Kurds including the ones from AKP that the problem is not a terror and security but a political one. This requires a political resolution.
2. Since 1984 the state has tried every method to sustain order in the ongoing conflicts. It can be said that there is no other way to be pursued. There have been declarations of packages to combating terrorism. None of them provided resolution. So the state like the prior experiences showed cannot win with this strategy.
3. It has to be taken into consideration that the HDP and DBP –which can be called mainstream Kurdish politics- has a strong societal base. In the rhetoric of the state " *HDP as an extension of the terrorist organization* " possesses 5 million votes. This includes the support of the mass that forms a base stated above. Therefore, it is not possible for the state to reclaim this mass with securitization.
4. Kurdish politics is not only based on a strong social base, but also has considerably with the corporate structure. In this regard it is necessary to remember the parliament, including three metropolitan municipalities and 11 provinces and more than 10 television channels.
5. It should not be forgotten that PKK has capacity of military mobilization. PKK was unable to form an armed uprising. However, it possesses' military mobilization that could perpetuate human resources, logistics and experience that can make military mobilization permanent.
6. PKK reproduces itself even though the state expects its dissolution. "The discourse of resistance" is influential for PKK for its institutional growth and reproduction. The Kurdish political identity has been produced over the mountain -grave-exile and paying "price" rhetoric that holds a central place in its discourse. The military success of the state reproduces prison and exile. So again it produces the PKK, as well as expanding it.
7. Apart from PKK and mainstream Kurdish politics there is a Kurdish population that reaches 15 million. At least half of the population does not give its approval to the project of the Republic. There are different social imaginations. Even though nations, nationalities are in use they see Kurdishness as a category equivalent to Turkishness, being an Arab, Farsi or German and demand equality.
8. Kurds are the majority in Turkey accounting about 15% of a portion of an integrated geographic region. Their three brothers live around this area. Kurdistan province in Iran, the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and the Kurds in Syria possess' cantons that are probable to turn into a federation. The geopolitical equation of the

Kurdish issue has already changed. And most importantly it has increased the multi-actor, multi-sectoral cross-border cooperation between Kurds incomparable than the past.

We have to find a new path. This is possible. The last section gives advices that we see are worthy for contribution to this path.

### **Conclusion and Political Recommendations**

*“When a conflict has been ongoing for decades, like the Kurdish problem, it is probable that the resolution might require multiple attempts. The fact that a resolution has not been found in the past, doesn’t necessarily mean that it is unsolvable, but only that more effort needs to be put in it.”*

The quotation belongs to Jonathan Powell, whom had played a major role between 1997-2007 as the British Chief Negotiator during the resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland. In the foreword of his book “Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts”, where he has shared his vast experiences on how to end conflicts with peace, Powell underlines patience as the first lesson. Also in this section, he reminds a very critical point: The Belfast Agreement (or the Good Friday Agreement, as more popularly known) signed between Britain and IRA in 1998, was actually very similar to the Sunningdale Agreement signed in 1973, which included clauses of power sharing. After a 25 year bloody period, the parties had reached an agreement on a very similar context.

Following a period of 30 years of armed conflict, with the Resolution Process of 2013-2015 was a very important progress that moved towards the demilitarization of the Kurdish problem and a political resolution. From the brink of a political resolution which would bring the possibility of a disarmament closer than ever before, we are now facing a surge of violence massive enough to completely abolish the “internal resolution politics” ongoing since the 1990s. In order not to lose 25 years like in the Northern Ireland, or go through even more devastation and loss of lives than these last eight months, we as a public and mostly the political actors have to find a way.

We have two important supports in this quest: Firstly, a great majority of the people supports disarmament and a peace settlement. The Kurdish problem has a lot of dimensions demanding resolution. But the social agreement has been established on that there is no need for violence and the solution of problems within democratic politics.

Secondly, the majority of the people believe the resolution of the Kurdish problem is possible within the territorial integrity of Turkey. It is well known that the social structure of Turkey makes this a necessity, and an option based on arms and violence shall bring a huge cost to all segments of the society. Since it comprises a significant opportunity for this, The Resolution Process has major public support.

The following suggestions aim to contribute to this searching for a way:

#### ***Non-conflict and Disarmament***

1. Ceasefire has to be maintained urgently, in order to heal the wounds of the city conflicts and provide relief.
2. Steps like lifting the parliamentary immunities, or closing of a political party, which might further enlarge the vortex of violence and deepen the erosion of trust, should be avoided. All related actors and mostly the political parties must act responsibly on this account.
3. In order to maintain a ceasefire, urban areas must be disarmed and demilitarized, starting from towns where conflicts were concentrated and large devastation has taken place. PKK/KCK should withdraw armed militia from urban areas, cease to seek “field dominance” with trenches and barricades. On the other hand, the government should end the curfews which even lead to entirely shutting down towns where tens of thousands of people live, lasting up to months as in Cizre and Sur. The government should also withdraw the military/police special forces, and bring the numbers of law enforcement personnel back to the routine levels of maintaining the routing public order.
4. Following the ceasefire, an official mourning should be declared for a one to three-day period, for the nearly two thousand citizens who lost their lives.

#### ***Societal Re-construction in Conflict Areas***

- 1 The wounds would be healed at Sur, Silvan, Cizre, Nusaybin, Dargeçit, Silopi, primarily in areas where the conflict is concentrated. There should be a mobilization at the national level for social reconstruction. In this context;
2. This district should be regarded as a social disaster area.

3. The government must reverse the plan that it made public at March 5, 2016, after intercourse with related actors, with the lead of local administrators, civil society organizations and opinion leaders
4. Active investigations and inquiries must be made on the loss of life and abuse of rights. A commission must be formed in the parliament. Also, a committee must be formed from professional associations, civil society organizations, religious communities and opinion leaders / representatives of mind of the people that can work on coordination.
5. Distinctive special units must be formed for contributing to the socio-economic and particular process in the mentioned districts through Development agencies. These units must have genuine resources and specific programs.
6. There must be a sister city in the country's western side for each district. The resources at public, civilian and private sectors, economic, social and institutional information and resources must help me mobilized. Civil society and private sectors should be built cooperation network.
7. Apart from Sister cities, trade associations, economic, social, cultural, civil society organizations working in the field should mobilize and build solidarity network.
8. Finally, for citizens should built media solidarity organizations and social networks should be involved in the campaign.

#### ***Forming Basis For a New Negotiation Process***

1. With the disarming the cities and societal construction activities new negotiation process should start. In this context;
2. As the recent conflict demonstrated to leave the path of this lose-lose game, it should be reminded to the public that the political solution for the Kurdish was a win-win aspect and should be discussed in public.
3. the parties should take some symbolic steps to overcome the problem of confidence that suffered a significant erosion. To get rid of the arms in the city, stop the operation and terminate the discussion on lifting immunity will be an important basis in this regard.

However, a meeting of Öcalan with wise people, journalists, delegation of intellectuals, a meeting or interaction with Kurds in Syria, the re-approach to 6551 coded "Termination of Terrorism and the Law on Strengthening Social Integration" Act and its implementation, steps from PKK / KCK showing the intention to lay down arms in Turkey will provide a significant contribution.

4. Forming a win-wing gain depends on the joint political goal that the sides will comply to.
5. By this means a new constitution and regime change discussions to determine this common political goals can be considered as an opportunity for the new social contract.
6. Presidential system, parliamentary system and autonomy / decentralization as political targets should be discussed effectively in public. These issues are on the agenda for a long time, but the advantages and disadvantages of each system are not well known, productive and problematic aspects of the public. In this regard, not only the political parties, academia and other social actors, especially the media should also take an active role on the subject.
7. Mainstream Kurdish movement is demanding autonomy, in other words, local / regional decentralization is possible in both parliamentary and presidential systems. In this regard, both options should be explained clearly, be based on an approach with compromise and facilitating the identification of common political objectives.
8. Removing the ambiguity of the negotiating agenda should take four critical issues centered in the light of previous experience: (1) public administration reform and decentralization, (2) linguistic / cultural pluralism and education in the mother tongue, (3) the expansion of the political space and (4) disarming of PKK.
9. The language should be disarmed. Primarily the AKP government, HDP, PKK/KCK also political parties, the media, civil society organizations, academy must form a language of consensus and resolution.



### ***A New Negotiation Process, its Mechanisms and Actors***

1. With the steps pointed out above the necessary conditions for the process to start again will be formed. By this means it is crucial to create an efficient resolution architecture. In order to do so an organizational/institutional participant mechanism must be build that can be audited from different networks and actors.
2. The parliament must take into consideration the political area that the process takes place. There should be a parliamentary commission that will lead the whole process. For the commission to work efficiently unanimity voting or qualified majority voting rather that majority must be taken as a basis.
3. As the absence of CHP and the opposition in the negotiations contributed to the failure of the process, integrating the opposition is very important. It seems challenging to integrate MHP to the process. However, CHP's inclusion is of critical importance. The participation of CHP will provide a stronger and healthier process.
4. International experiences show that if third parties take part in the process it is more likely to succeed. By this means and by taking into consideration the experiences and sensibility since 2009, a 'Monitoring Committee' must be formed. In order for parties to follow their words it is of critical importance.
5. Apart from the political parties at the parliament other political actors, social movements and organizations must be incorporated to the process.
6. By this means a societal negotiation mechanism must be formed. By taking into consideration the work of Turkey Peace Assembly, in all cities with the leadership of civil society Reconciliation and Resolution Councils must be formed.
7. The experience of Wise People should be taken into account and an independent Reconciliation and Resolution Committee must be formed to follow the whole process at the national level
8. Apart from mainstream Kurdish parties, Kurdish political actors, political parties, civil society, community, religious communities and opinion leaders must be involved in the process to build dialogue and negotiation mechanisms. On this, the government and the mainstream Kurdish movement must be pressured.
9. The media should take a part in the resolution process, and Reconciliation and Resolution, or a Peace Media must be formed. In this means the mainstream can execute peace programs, peace journalism, like the Green Bulletin form White Bulletin, Peace and Resolution orientated work in the written and visual media.
10. As media's role in the construction of the disbarment of words, it should play an active role.
11. Universities and should play a positive part in the solution. and in building consensus
12. Elective courses on peace and social reconciliation can be taught at university
13. Continuous and regular peace conferences can be done in all universities. accompanied by a schedule during the process
14. One in Diyarbakır (Dicle University), or Mardin (Artuklu University), the other being at a university in Ankara or Istanbul two Archive Center for Mediation and Resolution Process should be established. For the next process as well as documentation, the center can provide archiving and providing information, fulfill the functions of informing public that will provide solutions.
15. For reconciliation and solution, the Academic Advisory Board of consisting of academics working on conflict resolution and the Kurdish issue can be created.
16. The participation of Mediation and Resolution Process must be ensured. Peace and social consensus lessons in this regard should be given in all high school courses. Also, in the cities Reconciliation for Youth Councils should be formed like the Resolution of the Council in the cities should be created. Through these councils, the demand of the youth must be heard and included on the solution table.
17. What is going on at Syria and Iraq forces the process in Turkey to put the process in a regional equation. The increasing 'Kurdish Wave' should be seen as an opportunity to see abolish historical inequalities and build a shared future. The gains of Kurds that make up a significant part of Turkey's geography and population should be seen as

the earnings of Turkey, and This should be conducted with the establishment of friendly relationships with Kurds at Syria and Iraq.

18. Finally, when taking into consideration that the Oslo process started in 2008, there has been quite sufficient time for the parties to have discovered each other. With well-designed corporate / organizational architecture with increased control from the public, a new roadmap or Action Plan must be formed that will disable to parties to leave the table and should be shared with the public. The roadmap taken in a flexible framework will ease for actors to hold their promises, the efficient use of time, abolishment of ambiguity.

## APPENDIX 01 From Dolmabahçe to Present-day: What Has Occurred?

- **February 28, 2015** Dolmabahçe Meeting.<sup>13</sup>
- **February 28, 2015** Prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that the peace process has entered a new stage and with the termination of the voice of weapons there will be a democratic transition.<sup>14</sup>
- **March, 1 2015** The statement of KCK Co-chairmanship constituted that if the government fulfils its responsibilities they will carry out Öcalan's call for laying down arms.<sup>15</sup>
- **March, 1 2015** The US Department of State expressed that they were content with Öcalan's call for laying down arms.<sup>16</sup>
- **March, 11 2015** President Erdoğan stated that Öcalan's appeal for laying down arms was crucial for the establishment of trust safety, peace and stability. He inclined it not to be unfulfilled and taken into practice.<sup>17</sup>
- **March, 18 2015** Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan stated that apart from a mutual statement, claims about the determined names that will appear in the '*Monitoring Committee*' should not be taken into consideration.<sup>18</sup>
- **March, 20, 2015** President Tayyip Erdoğan, said that he was not aware of the '*Monitoring Committee*' and does not see it as a positive prospect.<sup>19</sup>
- **March, 21, 2015** President Erdoğan said he believed that Newrouz will be an opportunity in forming a new era.<sup>20</sup>
- **March, 21, 2015** Öcalan, in his Newrouz message that was read in Diyarbakır called for PKK to gather congress to lay down arms. The gathering of the congress was stuck on the condition of establishing a *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* that would include deputies and a '*Monitoring Committee*'.
- **March, 22, 2015** President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that he did not approve the Dolmabahçe meeting.<sup>21</sup>
- **April, 3, 2015** 'The Law Amending the Law on Powers and Duties of the Police, Other Laws and Decrees' known with the name Internal Security Package was approved by the president.<sup>22</sup>
- **April, 11, 2015** In the confrontation at Ağrı, Diyardin between the PKK and soldiers, 4 soldiers got wounded and 5 PKK members were killed.<sup>23</sup>
- **April, 21, 2015** The Election Statement of AKP included the continuation of the Peace Process after the June 7 elections.<sup>24</sup>
- **May 2, 2015** President Erdoğan criticized HDP saying that '*without burying weapons they do not have the right to criticize the government*'.<sup>25</sup>
- **May 17, 2015** KCK Executive Council held AKP responsible for the attacks on HDP election headquarters. The council stated that in such environment it is impossible to solve the Kurdish issue.<sup>26</sup>
- **May 31, 2015** Prime minister Davutoğlu stated that after elections they will reconsider the interlocutor of the Peace Process.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> "Ortak açıklamanın tam metni," *AljazeeraTurk*, 28.02.2015

<sup>14</sup> "Başbakan Davutoğlu: Silahın dili sona erecek", *NTV*, 28.02.2015.

<sup>15</sup> "KCK'dan Öcalan'ın çağrısına evet ama...", *AljazeeraTurk*, 01.03.2015.

<sup>16</sup> "ABD'den 'Silah bırak' çağrısına yorum", *Sabah*, 01.03.2015.

<sup>17</sup> "Erdoğan: Silah bırakma lafla olmaz", *AljazeeraTurk*, 11.03. 2015.

<sup>18</sup> "Yalçın Akdoğan'dan izleme heyeti açıklaması!" , *A Haber*, 19 .03. 2015.

<sup>19</sup> "Erdoğan'dan İzleme Heyeti açıklaması", *Hürriyet*, 20.03. 2015.

<sup>20</sup> "Erdoğan'dan Newroz Mesajı: Yepyeni Bir Döneme Vesile Olacak", *Bianet.org*, 21.03. 2015.

<sup>21</sup> "Erdoğan: Dolmabahçe toplantısını doğru bulmuyorum", *NTV*, 22.03. 2015.

<sup>22</sup> "İç Güvenlik Paketi onaylandı", *Sabah*, 03.04.2015.

<sup>23</sup> "Ağrı'da gerçekte ne yaşandı?", *BBC*, 13.04. 2015.

<sup>24</sup> "AKP beyannameye süreci ekledi", *AljazeeraTurk*, 21.04. 2015.

<sup>25</sup> "Erdoğan: Silahı gömmeden eleştiri hakları yok", *AljazeeraTurk*, 2.05.2015.

<sup>26</sup> "KCK: Bu ortamda çözüm mümkün değil", *AljazeeraTurk*, 17.05.2015.

<sup>27</sup> "Sürecin muhatabı 'gözden geçirilecek'", *AljazeeraTurk*, 31.05.2015.

- **June 5, 2015** Bomb attack at the Diyarbakır rally of HDP.<sup>28</sup>
- **June 7, 2015** By taking the %13,02 of the votes HDP entered the parliament with 80 deputies. For the first time in 13 years AKP lost the absolute majority to form the government.<sup>29</sup>
- **June 12, 2015** KCK announced that they will lay down the arms in their hands.<sup>30</sup>
- **June 15, 2015** After the capture of Tel Abyad (GrêSpî) the cantons of Kobanî and Jazira are geographically united.<sup>31</sup>
- **June 26, 2015** Erdoğan states, “we will never let the formation of a Kurdish state in Syria, south of our border”.<sup>32</sup>
- **July 3, 2015** HDP stated alarm bells were ringing on the process as the İmralı Comitee of HDP could not get permit to see Öcalan.<sup>33</sup>
- **July 1, 2015** KCK stated that the construction of dams and stations signify the breakdown of the ceasefire and the forces that are used will be on the target of the guerilla forces.<sup>34</sup>
- **July 14, 2015** KCK Executive Council Member Murat Karayılan stated that the Peace Process and the ceasefire is on a interim period and that they will act on the position of the new government to be formed.<sup>35</sup>
- **July 15, 2015** KCK co-president Besê Hozat stated that new process was a revolutionary people’s war.<sup>36</sup>
- **July 20, 2015** After a suicide bomb attack of ISIS in the Suruç district of Şanlıurfa, 32 young people lost their lives, 200 people got injured.<sup>37</sup>
- **July 22, 2015** In the Ceylanpınar district of Şanlıurfa two police officers were killed in their homes by being shot in the head.<sup>38</sup>
- **July 24, 2015** Turkey and US reached a statement on the usage of the Incirlik base for the usage of coalition forces to pursue air strikes against ISIS.<sup>39</sup>
- **July 24, 2015** F-16 planes of Turkish Armed Forces bombed PKK Camps at Zap, Gare, Haftanin, Metina and Havasin in Iraqi Kurdistan.<sup>40</sup>
- **August 12, 2015** President Erdoğan stated that “we will struggle till we put a cement on weapons and there is no single terrorist left in our borders”.<sup>41</sup>
- **August 12, 2015** KCK stated that: “*There is no option for the people of Kurdistan then self-governance.*”<sup>42</sup>
- **August 16, 2015** There has been a curfew at Muş, Varto, for the first time.<sup>43</sup>
- **August 17, 2015** The number of centers that declared self-governance rose to 16.<sup>44</sup>
- **August 17, 2015** KCK Executive Council Co-president Cemil Bayık: “*US should do mediation.*”<sup>45</sup>
- **August 19, 2015** Trenches were dug, barricades were set up in the streets of Cizre.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>28</sup> “HDP’nin Diyarbakır mitinginde patlama: Yaralılar var”, *Evrensel*, 05.06.2015.

<sup>29</sup> “7 Haziran 2015 Genel Seçim Merkezi”, *CNN Türk*, 07.06.2015.

<sup>30</sup> “KCK: Silah bırakma iradesi bize ait”, *Milliyet*, 13.06.2015.

<sup>31</sup> “Tel Abyad ‘YGP güçlerinin eline geçti’”, *BBC Türkçe*, 15.06.2015.

<sup>32</sup> “Erdoğan: Suriye’nin kuzeyinde bir devlet kurulmasına asla müsaade etmeyeceğiz”, *Mynet Haber*, 27.06.2015

<sup>33</sup> “HDP: Alarm zilleri çalıyor”, *Aljazeera*, 3 .07. 2015

<sup>34</sup> “KCK’dan Türkiye’ye küstah tehdit!”, *Gazete Vatan*, 11 .07. 2015.

<sup>35</sup> “KCK: Çekilmekle saflık ettik, ateşkes de çözüm süreci de ara dönemde”, *T24*, 14 .07. 2015.

<sup>36</sup> Hozat, Besê, “Yeni süreç, devrimci halk savaşı sürecidir”, *Özgür Gündem*, 15.07.2015.

<sup>37</sup> “Şanlıurfa Suruç’ta intihar saldırısı”, *NTV*, 20.07.2015.

<sup>38</sup> “Şanlıurfa’da 2 polis öldürüldü”, *Time Türk*, 22 .07. 2015.

<sup>39</sup> “ABD: Türkiye izin verdi, IŞİD Incirlik’ten vurulacak”, *BBC Türkçe*, 24.07.2015.

<sup>40</sup> “Türkiye Kuzey Irak’a operasyon düzenledi!”, *CNN Türk*, 24 .07. 2015.

<sup>41</sup> “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan terör açıklaması”, *NTV*, 11 .08. 2015.

<sup>42</sup> “KCK: ‘Kürdistan halkı için özyönetimden başka bir seçenek kalmamıştır’”, *T24*, 12.08.2015.

<sup>43</sup> “Varto’da sokağa çıkma yasağı”, *Hürriyet*, 17.08.2015.

<sup>44</sup> “Öz-yönetim ilan edilen merkez sayısı 16’a çıktı”, *T24*, 20.08.2015.

<sup>45</sup> “Kandil: ABD ile görüşüyoruz”, *AljazeeraTurk*, 17.08.2015.

<sup>46</sup> “Cizre sokaklarında hendekler, mevziler ve tedirginlik”, *Radikal*, 19.08.2015.

- **September 3, 2015** Turkish Armed Forces's cross-border operation warrant for Syria and Iraq was extended.<sup>47</sup>
- **September 6, 2015** In PKK's Dağlica attack 16 Turkish soldiers lost their lives<sup>48</sup>
- **September 8, 2015** 13 police officers lost their lives after a PKK attack in Iğdır.<sup>49</sup>
- **September 15, 2015** 22 people lost their life at Cizre where a 8 day curfew was in place.<sup>50</sup>
- **September 24, 2015** Russia got engaged in the Syrian war with its air campaign.<sup>51</sup>
- **October 10, 2015** The "Labor, Peace, Democracy Rally" that was commanded by KESK, (Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions) DİSK, (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions of Turkey) TMMOB, (Chambers of Turkish Architects and Engineers) and TTB (Turkish Medical Association) at October 10, 2015 was attacked by 2 suicide bombs resulting in 102 deaths and the injury of hundreds of people.<sup>52</sup>
- **October 10, 2015** By proposing that the November 1<sup>st</sup> elections should be conducted in a non-conflicting environment KCK announced that it took the decision of inaction.<sup>53</sup>
- **November 1, 2015** AKP received %49,48 percent of the votes, gaining absolute majority. HDP received %10,75 of the votes and entered the parliament with 59 deputies.<sup>54</sup>
- **November 9, 2015** KCK terminated its decision of inaction.<sup>55</sup>
- **November 23, 2015** Demirtaş filed a criminal complaint for the attempt of an assassination conducted against him.<sup>56</sup>
- **November 28, 2015** Diyarbakır Bar President Tahir Elçi was murdered.<sup>57</sup>
- **December 18, 2015** HDP, HDK, (Peoples' Democratic Congress) DBP, (Democratic Regions' Party) DTK (Democratic Society Congress) co-presidents in a common press statement at Diyarbakır stated that "we embrace the demand of the struggle of the people and the quest for self governance with our institutions."<sup>58</sup>
- **December 25, 2015** HDP, alleged that the government was preparing a "war simulation" under the name "Deconstruction Plan" through Secretariat of Public Order and Security.<sup>59</sup>
- **December 27, 2015** After the Emergency Meeting of DTK that HDP, HDK participated a "democratic autonomous regions" was issued containing 14 articles.<sup>60</sup>
- **December 30, 2015** PKK/KCK has implemented a new formation called Civil Defense Corps (Yekineyên Parastina Sîvîl - YPS) in the districts that curfews and confrontation continued.<sup>61</sup>
- **January 11, 2016** 1128 academics has broadcasted a text that criticized the government on the operations and curfews in the region and called for the re-establishment of the negotiation table.<sup>62</sup>
- **January 14, 2016** In the PKK attack to a police department in the Çınar district 6 people died, 43 people got injured.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>47</sup> "Irak ve Suriye tezkeresi kabul edildi", *BBC Türkçe*, 03.09.2015.

<sup>48</sup> "TSK: Dağlica'da 16 asker şehit", *BBC Türkçe*, 07.09.2015.

<sup>49</sup> "Iğdır'da polis aracına bombalı saldırı! 13 Şehit", *Milliyet*, 08.09.2015.

<sup>50</sup> "STK'lardan Cizre raporu: 22 kişi kayatını kaybetti, yaralıların tedavisi engellendi", *Agos*, 15.09.2015.

<sup>51</sup> "Rus uçakları IŞİD'i bombalıyor", *AljazeeraTurk*, 24.09.2015.

<sup>52</sup> "Türkiye tarihinin en kanlı terör eylemi: Ankara'daki bombalı saldırıda en az 95 ölü", *diken.com.tr*, 10.10.2015.

<sup>53</sup> "KCK, eylemsizlik kararı aldığını açıkladı", *Evrensel*, 10.10.2015.

<sup>54</sup> "1 Kasım 2015 Genel Seçim Merkezi", *CNN Türk*, 01.11.2015.

<sup>55</sup> "KCK 'eylemsizlik' kararını sonlandırdı", *IMC TV*, 05.11.2015.

<sup>56</sup> "Demirtaş'tan Suikast Girişimine İlişkin Suç Duyurusu", *Bianet*, 23.11.2015.

<sup>57</sup> "Diyarbakır Baro Başkanı Tahir Elçi öldürüldü", *BBC Türkçe*, 28.11.2015.

<sup>58</sup> "HDP, DTK, DBP, HDK: Faşizm rica ile minnetle geriletilmez, direnişi büyütelim", *sendika.org*, 18.12.2015.

<sup>59</sup> "Davutoğlu'na soru: 15 bin Kürt'ün ölümünü öngören 'çöktürme planı' gerçek mi?", *sendika.org*, 25.12.2015.

<sup>60</sup> "DTK'dan 'öz yönetim' deklarasyonu", *AljazeeraTurk*, 27.12.2015.

<sup>61</sup> "PKK'dan yeni oluşum: YPS", *Milliyet*, 30.12.2015.

<sup>62</sup> "Bu suça ortak olmayacağız! Em â nebin hevparênvîsuci!", *Barış İçin Akademisyenler*, 11.01.2016.

<sup>63</sup> "Diyarbakır Çınar'da PKK'lılar Emniyet'e bombalı araçla saldırı", *CNN Türk*, 14.01.2016.

- **January 15, 2016** There has been arrest, ransacking, judicial and administrative investigations to the academics that signed the petition.<sup>64</sup>
- **February, 5, 2016** Prime minister Davutoğlu pleaded his Counter Terrorism Action Plan in Mardin.<sup>65</sup>
- **February, 8, 2016** Government spokesman Numan Kurtulmuş pleaded that they are trying to disable PYD's participation to Geneva Conference through diplomatic means.<sup>66</sup>
- **February, 14, 2016** Turkey hit YPG site near Azaz and the Menagh airport newly captured by the group with artillery.<sup>67</sup>
- **February, 17, 2016** 28 people lost their lives in the bomb attack against a military service vehicle. While TAK (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks) took responsibility Ankara claimed that the attack was done by YPG.<sup>68</sup>
- **February, 21, 2016** US and Turkey had deep standoff on the PYD/YPG issue.<sup>69</sup>
- **February, 22, 2016** After the “basement” and “ambulance” crisis the funerals that reached the hospitals in Cizre reached 167.<sup>70</sup>
- **February, 26, 2016** The television channel IMC that was broadcasting through *Türksat* satellite was shaded.<sup>71</sup>
- **March, 2, 2016** The curfew at Cizre was lifted partially after 79 days.<sup>72</sup>
- **March, 9, 2016** The operations at Diyarbakır, Sur that started at November 28, 2015 ended after 103 days. The police search still continues in the district.<sup>73</sup>
- **March, 11, 2016** After the operations at Sur, Cizre and İdil interior minister Efkân Ala stated that there will operations at Yüksekova, Nusaybin and Şırnak.<sup>74</sup>
- **March, 13, 2016** In the Ankara Güven Park explosion that TAK (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks) took responsibility 37 people lost their lives, 125 got injured.<sup>75</sup>
- **March, 15, 2016** After Sur district in Diyarbakır a curfew was declared in Bağlar, Kaynaratepe neighborhood.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>64</sup> “‘Barış için Akademisyenler’e gözaltı ve baskınlar”, *BBC Türkçe*, 15.01.2016.

<sup>65</sup> “Başbakan ‘master planı’ açıkladı”, *Yeni Şafak*, 05.02.2016.

<sup>66</sup> “Kurtulmuş: PYD’nin Cenevre’ye katılmasını engelledik”, *Evrensel*, 08.02.2016.

<sup>67</sup> “Türkiye YPG’yi vurdu”, *AljazeeraTurk*, 14.02.2016.

<sup>68</sup> “Ankara’daki saldırıyı TAK üstlendi”, *IMC TV*, 19.02.2016.

<sup>69</sup> Tanış, Tolga, “Gerçekler”, *Hürriyet*, 21.02.2016.

<sup>70</sup> “137 cenaze bekliyor: Cizir’de suç aletleri yok ediliyor”, *Özgür Gündem*, 22.02.2016.

<sup>71</sup> “Basın özgürlüğünün ‘ak günü’: Dünder ve Gül yayındayken İMC TV karartıldı”, *diken.com.tr*, 26.02.2016.

<sup>72</sup> “79 günlük sokağa çıkma yasağının ardından ilçeye dönen Cizreliler, şimdi ne yapacak?”, *T24*, 03.03.2016.

<sup>73</sup> “Sur’da operasyon sona erdi”, *Radikal*, 09.03.2016.

<sup>74</sup> “Ala: Yüksekova, Nusaybin ve Şırnak’ta operasyonlar yapılacak”, *IMC TV*, 11.03.2016.

<sup>75</sup> “Ankara’da bombalı araçla saldırı: 37 kişi öldü, 125 kişi yaralandı!”, *T24*, 13.03.2016.

<sup>76</sup> Diyarbakır Valiliği, “Bağlar Kaymaklığı’ndan Duyuru (Sokağa Çıkma Yasağı)”, *Diyarbakır Valiliği*, 15.03.2016.